# SECURITY INFORMATION CONFIDENTIAL

#53760-A

### CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

21 November 1951

SUBJECT: DRAFT TERMS OF REFERENCE: NIE-49: SWEDEN®S
POSITION IN THE EAST-WEST CONFLICT
(Second draft for consideration of the Board)

#### THE PROBLEM

To analyze Sweden's present attitudes and policies toward East and West, and to assess Sweden's strategic importance.

#### DISCUSSION

### I. THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF SWEDEN

A. What strategic considerations flow from Sweden's geographic position, with reference to the Baltic Sea and its approaches?

To the northern flank of Europe? To Norway? To Finland?

To air routes? Its terrain and communications?

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- B. What strategic considerations flow from Sweden's economic resources and weaknesses? Its mining, steel, engineering, and ship-building industries? Its munitions industry, including scientific research and development? Its labor force? Its lack of coal and petroleum products?
- C. What strategic considerations flow from Sweden's armed forces and military installations? How large and how effective are the Swedish army, navy, and air force? What are the values of the services installations and facilities?

# II. PRESENT SWEDISH POLICY WITH REFERENCE TO THE EAST-WEST CONFLICT

- A. What is Sweden's foreign policy and what factors lie behind it? Do Swede's unreservedly support the "alliance-free" role?
- B. What is Sweden's attitude toward the USSR and what factors
  lie behind it? What is the character and extent of Swedish
  hostility toward the USSR? What are the chances that the
  Swedes would yield to Soviet economic pressure? To military

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threat? Are they susceptible to Soviet political and psychological pressure? Would they resolutely resist Soviet armed attack?

- C. In what circumstances, if any, might Sweden cooperate militarily with the USSR?
- D. What is Sweden's attitude toward the European Satellites, and what factors lie behind it?
- E. What is Sweden's attitude toward the US and its Western Allies, and what factors lie behind it? What are Sweden's economic relations with the Western Powers? Do Swedes believe that the West could or would effectively come to Sweden's aid in event of a Soviet attack?
- F. In what circumstances, if any, might Sweden join the NATO or, at least, cooperate in Western military planning? What would be the effect on Sweden's attitude of the addition of Germany to the NATO? Soviet assumption of control over Finland? Substantial growth of Western military strength?

  Need for military equipment? A Soviet attack on a NATO member?

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G. To what extent is Sweden's "neutrality" qualified by its dissimilar relations with the Soviet Bloc and the Western Allies? Is there any discernible trend toward closer relations with the West?

# III. THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES TO THE WEST OF SWEDEN'S POSITION

- A. During the Cold war.
  - 1. Does non-adherence to the NATO impair Sweden's defense capabilities? Is Sweden, given the external military purchases now permitted it, capable of maintaining competent armed forces?
  - 2. Would Sweden's adherence to the NATO, prior to possible hostilities, produce important military benefits for the West? Might it provoke reprisals by the Soviet Bloc against Sweden? Might it raise a threat to Finland's independence? Might it increase East-West tension?
  - 3. Are Sweden's strategic industries producing for the benefit of the Soviet Bloc? Are they producing for the benefit of the West?
  - · 4. Will Sweden continue to cooperate with the West with respect to strategic trade questions?

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- B. In event of general war.
  - How would the strategic and tactical situation be affected if Sweden desired, and were permitted, to remain neutral? Considering the probable unavail—ability of fuel from the West, would Sweden be compelled to be benevolently neutral toward the USSR? Would Western military operations be seriously hampered, and those of the Soviets facilitated, by a neutral Sweden? How would the approaches to the Baltic Sea be affected? The northern flank of Europe? Air routes? What would Sweden's value be for intelligence purposes?
  - 2. How would the strategic and tactical situation be affected if Sweden were attacked by the USSR and actively resisted? Would the Swedish forces resist effectively? Could Sweden's military efforts affect the main battle in Europe favorably for the West? Would Sweden's military facilities be of use to the NATO forces? Would Sweden be an effective buffer for Norway? Would subversive elements in Sweden be capable of achieving serious disruption? Would the Swedes continue guerrilla warfare if their organized resistance were broken?

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3. How would the strategic and tactical situation be affected if Sweden joined or capitulated to the USSR? Would consequent Soviet domination of the Baltic Sea and the northern European flank critically affect the main battle in Europe? Would Swedish forces conceivably fight against the Western Powers? Would they possibly attempt to flee to the West in order to join "liberation" forces? Would Swedish industry contribute significantly to the Soviet war economy? Would there be an important resistance and sabotage movement in Sweden? Could the Soviet Bloc supply Sweden with adequate quantities of needed primary products?